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Future time perspective (FTP) modulates individuals’ temporal orientation in selecting
their motivations and goals, which widely influences their cognitions and behaviors.
However, it remains unclear how FTP exactly affects intertemporal choice. To clarify the
effect of FTP on intertemporal choice, 90 college students (Mage = 21.70, SD = 1.23)
were randomly assigned to the limited FTP condition (16 males, 29 females) and
the open-ended FTP condition (17 males, 28 females). In the limited FTP condition,
participants were instructed to imagine their states of being 70 years old, whereas in
the open-ended FTP condition, they were instructed to describe their current states.
All participants then completed a series of intertemporal choice tasks, in which they
chose from gain- and loss-related choices occurring at various time points. Results
showed that the participants who received the future-imagining manipulation had more
limited FTP compared with those who did not receive the manipulation, which confirmed
the validity of the FTP manipulation. A 2 (FTP: limited vs. open-ended) × 2 (type of
choice: gain vs. loss) repeated measures ANOVA on discount rate revealed a significant
interaction between these two factors. The participants in the limited FTP condition
had higher discount rates on gain-related choices but showed no difference on loss-
related choices compared with the participants under the open-ended FTP condition.
The results suggest that limited FTP could lower individuals’ future orientation (i.e.,
willingness to delay an outcome) on gain-related, but not on loss-related, intertemporal
decision-making.
Keywords: future time perspective, imagine future, intertemporal choice, gain-related choice, loss-related choice,
discount rate
INTRODUCTION
Intertemporal choice involves tradeoffs among costs and benefits occurring at different time points
(Frederick et al., 2002). A typical paradigm on intertemporal choice is to ask people to choose
between sooner and later gains. People tend to choose the sooner gains, although the later gains are
larger in size (Frederick et al., 2002; Green and Myerson, 2004; Berns et al., 2007).
A series of elegant mathematical models have been proposed by economists and
psychologists to interpret such a preference for sooner gains (Frederick et al., 2002),
such as the exponential discounting model (Samuelson, 1937) and hyperbolic discounting
model (Ainslie, 1975). One common idea in these models is that the subjective value
or utility of an outcome would be mentally discounted by decision-makers when the
outcome is delayed. The degree of discounting can be indexed by a discount rate—a
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larger discount rate indicates a higher degree of discounting,
which means that a sooner gain is more preferred over a later
gain (Frederick et al., 2002).
Delay discounting happens not only to gains but also to losses.
Discounting of future losses and gains could be described in
similar discounting functions (Loewenstein, 1987; Estle et al.,
2006). However, losses are usually discounted at lower rates
compared with gains, which is termed the sign effect or gain-
loss asymmetry (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992; Frederick et al.,
2002; Xu et al., 2009). Loss aversion from the prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) has been applied to interpret
such an effect. Loss aversion illustrates that losses have a larger
psychological impact compared with gains of the same size,
which means that the psychological impact of delayed losses is
also larger than delayed gains of the same size (Loewenstein
and Prelec, 1992; Frederick et al., 2002). The sign effect also
suggests that subjective values of losses are less influenced by
delay compared with gains.
As delay discounting involves evaluation and choice of
outcomes that will happen in the future, perception of future
time is particularly relevant to intertemporal decision-making.
Investigations on how perception of speed, length, concomitant
cost, and risk of time delay influence intertemporal choice have
shown that the temporal discount rate would be higher when a
same period of delay is perceived to be slower, longer, more costly,
or more risky (Frederick et al., 2002; Löckenhoff et al., 2011).
Future time perspective (FTP), as a critical component of
time perception, can also influence delay discounting (Guo et al.,
2017). The socioemotional selectivity theory (SST; Carstensen
et al., 1999) asserts that individuals’ orientation of life goals is
associated with their FTP. In the context of SST, FTP specifically
refers to individuals’ subjective perception of the open-endedness
of their future time. According to SST, people prioritize
future-oriented goals (e.g., acquisition of knowledge) and distal
outcomes (e.g., a bright future) more when they perceive their
future time as open-ended, whereas people prioritize present-
oriented goals and immediate outcomes (e.g., fulfillment of
emotional satisfaction) more when they perceive their future time
as limited. As people grow older, they perceive future time as
increasingly limited, and thus, they gradually change their life
goals from future- to present-oriented. The age-related transition
in goal orientation resulting from FTP change has been verified,
and moreover, it brings widespread and pervasive effects onto
cognitions and behaviors, such as attention, memory, social
interaction, and decision-making (e.g., Carstensen et al., 1999;
Reed and Carstensen, 2012).
According to SST, FTP can affect intertemporal decision-
making such that older adults are more present oriented
compared with younger adults when making intertemporal
choices. Empirical studies have shown that older adults had
lower discount rates (i.e., more future oriented) compared with
younger adults did (Green et al., 1999; Harrison, 2002; Read
and Read, 2004; Reimers et al., 2009; Simon et al., 2010; Jimura
et al., 2011; Löckenhoff et al., 2011), which seems to contradict
the prediction of SST. One possibility is that age difference
in discount rate might be confounded by multiple factors.
Indeed, the psychological motives underlying intertemporal
choice are complex, including not only perception of time but
also factors related to intelligence (Shamosh and Gray, 2007),
personality (Wittmann and Paulus, 2008), and sensitivity to
rewards (Samanez-Larkin et al., 2011). All these factors could be
related to age difference in discount rate. To clarify the effect of
FTP on discount rate, the effects of these age-related confounding
factors need to be controlled. To achieve the purpose, the
present study experimentally manipulated younger adults’ FTP
to examine its effect on intertemporal choice.
To control for age-related confounding factors when
examining the effect of FTP on intertemporal choice, the
present study recruited younger adults only and experimentally
manipulated their FTP to see how FTP manipulation alters their
discount rate during intertemporal choice. Empirical studies
have demonstrated that participants’ FTP could be manipulated
by asking them to imagine different scenarios relevant to the
open-endedness of future time, such as to imagine a limited or
expansive future (Fredrickson and Carstensen, 1990; Fung et al.,
1999; Valero et al., 2015). To foreshorten participants’ FTP in the
current study, we instructed them to imagine and describe their
states of themselves being 70 years old (Ye, 2014).
As limited FTP leads to more focus on present-oriented
outcomes, and open-ended FTP leads to more future-oriented
outcomes (Carstensen et al., 1999; Freund and Baltes, 2008), we
postulated that
Hypothesis 1. Participants with foreshortened FTP (in the
limited FTP condition) would have higher temporal discount
rates compared with participants who received no FTP
manipulation (in the open-ended FTP condition).
As described above, the sign effect, or say, gain-loss
asymmetry, in intertemporal choice (e.g., Thaler, 1981;
Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992) suggests that loss may be
less affected by time perception. We thus expected that
Hypothesis 2. The effect of FTP on temporal discount rate
would be smaller for losses than for gains.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Participants were 90 college students from Hubei University in
China (Mage = 21.70, SD = 1.23). They were randomly assigned
to the limited FTP condition (16 males, 29 females, Mage = 21.49,
SD = 1.06) and open-ended FTP condition (17 males, 28 females,
Mage = 21.84, SD = 1.36). Eight additional participants were
excluded, including five who failed in following the instructions
and three who did not complete the experiment. The present
study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Faculty
of Education in Hubei University in terms of the ethics and
safety of psychological experiments. Written informed consent
was obtained from all participants. Each participant was paid ¥20
(∼$3.1) at the end of the experiment.
Materials
FTP Scale
The Chinese version of the FTP scale (Fung et al., 2001;
Cronbach’s alpha = 0.76) was used to measure subjective
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perception of future time. The scale consists of 10 items (an
example item is “Many opportunities await me in the future”).
Participants rated the items on a five-point Likert scale (from
1 = “very untrue” to 5 = “very true”). A higher total score indicates
that future time is perceived as more open-ended. The Cronbach’s
alpha was 0.72 in the present study.
Guidance for Imagination of Future
To make FTP limited, participants were asked to imagine and
describe their states of health, cognition, and emotion at the age
of 70 years according to the guidance developed by Ye (2014). The
guidance includes four open-end questions: (1) “Please imagine
and describe your health status when you are 70 years old”; (2)
“Please imagine and describe your daily life when you are 70 years
old”; (3) “Please imagine and describe your emotional changes
when you are 70 years old”; (4) “Please imagine and describe
changes in your abilities of cognition, memory, and thinking.”
Participants’ answer to each question should consist of 50 words
at least. FTP was measured by the Chinese version of the FTP
scale after the imagination to check validity of the manipulation.
Intertemporal Decision-Making Task
Participants needed to make a series of choices between an
immediate gain (or loss) of ¥1000 ($157.7) and a delayed (i.e.,
2 months later) gain (or loss) of ¥1050, 1100, 1150, 1250,
1350, 1500, 1700, 1950 ($165.5, 173.4, 181.3, 197.0, 212.8, 236.4,
268.0). The amounts of gain and loss, as well as the length of
time interval, were determined according to Tao et al. (2015),
which reported that these were sensitive for the detection of
experimental effects among young Chinese participants.
Experimental Design and Procedure
The current study adopted a 2 (FTP: limited vs. open-ended)× 2
(type of choice: gain vs. loss) experimental design, with FTP as
a between-subject variable and type of choice as a within-subject
variable.
Participants were randomly assigned to either the limited
FTP or open-ended FTP condition. Participants in the former
condition received FTP manipulation (i.e., imagining their future
states), whereas those in the latter condition were asked to
describe their current states by four questions similar to the
guidance for imagination: (1) “Please describe your current
states of health”; (2) “Please describe your daily life”; (3) “Please
describe your emotional states”; (4) “Please describe your abilities
in cognition, memory, and thinking.” Then, all participants
completed the FTP scale. They then turned to 12 gain-related and
12 loss-related intertemporal choice tasks, which were presented
on a computer screen by E-Prime 2.0.
In the gain-related intertemporal-choice tasks, the description
of the situation reads:
“Suppose that you have participated in a rewarding social
activity, and you have two options to get your monetary reward:
(1) receive it now; (2) receive it 2 months later. The amounts of
money are different in these two options. Please make a choice
that you prefer in each of the follow-up pairs of options.”
In the loss-related intertemporal-choice tasks, the description
of the situation reads:
“Suppose that you have made a serious mistake in a group
activity, and you have to compensate for it by paying money. You
have two options to pay: (1) pay it now; (1) pay it 2 months later.
The amounts of money are different in these two options. Please
make a choice that you prefer in each of the follow-up pairs of
options.”
The immediate and delayed options were presented on the
left or right side of the computer screen randomly. The order of
gain and loss was counterbalanced across subjects (the procedure
details are given in Figure 1).
Data Analyses
Participants’ preference for immediate or delayed gain/loss was
indexed by the temporal discount rate originated from the
hyperbolic discounting function: Vd = V/(1+kd), where Vd is
the subjective value after discounting, V is the objective value
without discounting, k is the discount rate, and d is the length
of delay (Mazur and Coe, 1987; Frederick et al., 2002; Kazuhisa
and Hajime, 2016). To obtain the discount rate (k) for each
participant, we first identified his/her switching point in the series
of intertemporal choice tasks: the point where he/she changed
FIGURE 1 | The procedure of the experiment under open-ended vs. limited FTP condition. The choice pairs were presented in random order within the gain/loss
condition. The positions (left or right) of the immediate choices and delayed choices were pseudo-randomized, such that the immediate choices were presented on
the left side in half of the trials but on the right side in the other half of the trials.
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choice from the immediate to a delayed option, or from a delayed
to the immediate option. At this switching point, the immediate
(representing Vd in the hyperbolic discounting function) and
delayed outcomes (representing V) had the same subjective value
for the certain participants. With these values, the discount
rate (k) could be calculated for each participant based on the
hyperbolic discounting function. All discount rates (ks) were then
submitted to SPSS 22 for a 2 (FTP: limited vs. open-ended) × 2
(type of choice: gain vs. loss) mixed design, repeated measures
ANOVA.
The discount rate is often not normally distributed (e.g., Jones
and Rachlin, 2006; Margittai et al., 2015), which violates the
assumption of ANOVA. To confirm the reliability of results, we
repeated the ANOVA for discount factor f (i.e., the immediate
value divided by future value at the switching point), which is
usually normal distributed.
RESULTS
Demographics
Independent t-tests showed no significant difference in the
participants’ age between the limited FTP and open-ended FTP
conditions, t = −1.38, p = 0.17, Cohen’s d = 0.29. No significant
difference was found in the level of monthly living consumption
between conditions [for the limited FTP condition, M = ¥1,153.33
($181.74), SD = ¥209.54 ($33.02); for the open-ended FTP
condition, M = ¥1,235.56 ($194.70), SD = ¥295.54 ($46.57);
t =−1.52, p = 0.13, Cohen’s d = 0.32].
FTP Manipulation Check
The mean score of FTP measured after manipulation was 28.64
(SD = 6.51) in the limited FTP condition and 35.11 (SD = 4.29) in
the open-ended FTP condition. Independent t-tests showed that
the latter condition had significantly higher FTP scores compared
with the former condition (t =−5.56, p< 0.01, Cohen’s d = 1.19),
indicating that the limited FTP group had more limited FTP. The
results confirmed the validity of the manipulation.
Analyses of Discount Rate
The discount rates (ks) for the different experimental conditions
are as follows: for the limited FTP condition, mean kgain = 0.15
(SD = 0.12) and mean kloss = 0.05 (SD = 0.09); for the open-
ended FTP condition, mean kgain = 0.08 (SD = 0.07) and mean
kloss = 0.03 (SD = 0.04).
A 2 (FTP: limited vs. open-ended) × 2 (type of choice: gain
vs. loss) repeated measures ANOVA on discount rates showed
that the main effect of FTP was significant (i.e., higher in the
limited FTP condition than in the open-ended FTP condition),
F(1,88) = 11.68, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.12; the main effect of types
of choice was significant (i.e., higher for gains than for losses),
F(1,88) = 35.53, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.30; and the interaction effect
was significant, F(1,88) = 4.31, p = 0.05, η2p = 0.05. As shown in
Figure 2, simple effect analyses showed that the participants with
limited FTP had higher discount rates for gains than those with
open-ended FTP, F(1,88) = 11.39, p< 0.01, η2p = 0.11; the discount
rates for loss between these two FTP conditions had no significant
difference, F(1,88) = 2.11, p = 0.15, η2p = 0.02.
To confirm the reliability of results, we repeated the ANOVA
for discount factor f (i.e., the immediate value divided by a future
value at the switching point), which is usually normal distributed.
Discount rates (f s) for different experimental conditions are
as follows: for the limited FTP condition, mean f gain = 0.79
(SD = 0.02) and mean f loss = 0.92 (SD = 0.02); for the open-
ended FTP condition, mean f gain = 0.87 (SD = 0.01) and mean
f loss = 0.95 (SD = 0.01).
A 2 (FTP: limited vs. open-ended)× 2 (type of choice: gain vs.
loss) repeated measures ANOVA on discount rates (f s) showed
similar results with abovementioned: the main effect of FTP was
significant, F(1,88) = 8.40, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.09; the main effect of
types of choice was significant, F(1,88) = 46.75, p< 0.01, η2p = 0.35;
the interaction effect was marginally significant, F(1,88) = 3.33,
p = 0.07, η2p = 0.04. As shown in Figure 2, simple effect analyses
showed that participants with limited FTP had a lower f value for
gains than those with open-ended FTP, F(1,88) = 9.03, p < 0.01,
η2p = 0.10. The discount (f s) for loss between these two FTP
conditions had no significant difference, F(1,88) = 1.47, p = 0.23,
η2p = 0.01.
DISCUSSION
By manipulating younger participants’ FTP, the current study
revealed that FTP modulates discount rates for gains, but not
for losses. To be specific, participants under the limited FTP
condition discounted gains more than their counterparts under
the open-ended FTP condition, but no significant difference was
seen in discounting of loss between these two conditions. The
results partly confirm our hypotheses that limited FTP would lead
to higher discount rates, and that the impact of FTP on discount
rate would be higher for gains than for losses.
The results that limited FTP contributes to higher discount
rates on gains indicate that perceived open-endedness of future
time remarkably affects participants’ intertemporal choice. The
finding is consistent with the suggestion of SST (Carstensen et al.,
1999) that open-ended FTP makes people focus more on future-
oriented motivations, goals, and outcomes. When people have a
long period of time ahead to live for, they tend to be more willing
to delay gains to achieve more.
Older adults (with limited FTP) have been shown to have
lower discount rates than younger adults (with open-ended
FTP) (e.g., Harrison, 2002; Jimura et al., 2011), which seems to
contradict the speculation derived from SST (Carstensen et al.,
1999). We argue that these studies did not well control for
other age-related confounding variables, and thus could not
be used to infer the effect of FTP on intertemporal choice.
The current study manipulated the FTP of younger adults
to examine its effect on intertemporal choice, such that the
confounding effects of age-related factors were clearly excluded.
By doing so, we found that FTP indeed significantly influences
participants’ intertemporal choice. Moreover, emerging literature
has explained the changes in FTP in different ages from the
perspective of “psychological connectedness to the future self ”
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FIGURE 2 | Discount rates of intertemporal choices for gains and losses under limited vs. open-ended FTP condition.
(Urminsky, 2017). People are more likely to be “impatient”
and prioritize the present over the future when they perceive
a weak link between current and future self, compared with
those who perceive a close link between current and future
(Hershfield et al., 2011; Urminsky, 2017). In the present
study, participants in the imagination group had more limited
FTP compared with the control group, and thus, they might
perceive a weaker connection between their present and
future self so that they preferred instant rewards in decision-
making.
We found no significant difference in the discount rates for
losses between the limited and open-ended FTP conditions.
This result did not verify our hypothesis that limited FTP
would increase the discount rates for both gains and losses
but supported the hypothesis that FTP impacts discounting
of losses less than that of gains. The finding is compatible
with the sign effect: people discount losses at lower rates
compared with gains in intertemporal choice (Thaler, 1987;
Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992). A small increase in loss might
bring a psychological impact comparable in terms of size to
a psychological impact brought by a larger increase in gain,
as asserted by the prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979).
It might be arbitrary to conclude that FTP did not impact
the discount rate for losses based on our results. Although our
settings for the intertemporal decision tasks (i.e., amount of
gains/losses and length of delay) were found to be proper in
the former studies (Liu et al., 2015; Tao et al., 2015), they may
be not sensitive enough to catch the effects of FTP on discount
rates for losses. To address this limitation in the current study,
future studies may systematically change these settings to verify
the impact of FTP on discounting of losses.
Future studies could manipulate older adults’ FTP to
examine the effect of FTP on intertemporal choice. Although
manipulation of FTP results in similar patterns of cognitive and
behavioral changes among younger and older adults (Fredrickson
and Carstensen, 1990; Fung et al., 1999; Valero et al., 2015), it
is unsure whether this is also the case for intertemporal choice.
Future studies could also explore the effect of FTP in different
domains. Most studies on intertemporal choice have focused on
monetary gains and/or losses, whereas a few studies have revealed
that people may discount other items (e.g., food) differently
than money (e.g., Frederick et al., 2002). It is thus important to
examine the robustness of the FTP effect on intertemporal choice
across domains.
CONCLUSION
By experimentally manipulating younger participants’ FTP, the
current study found that limited FTP led to stronger temporal
discounting on gains, but not on losses, compared with open-
ended FTP. The finding suggests that FTP is more likely to
impact intertemporal decisions on gains than on losses: people
are less willing to delay gains when they perceive their future
life time is limited. The study provides direct evidence on the
relationship between FTP and discount rate in intertemporal
choice. This finding contributes to reconciling the contradiction
in the literature and supports SST, which asserts a strong relation
between FTP and the temporal orientation of motivations and
goals.
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